# The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands

Data

16.07.2015

16.07.2015

Autori

Ricardo **Nieva **(Universidad de Lima)

Codice JEL

C71, C72, C78

C71, C72, C78

Parole chiave:

Coalitional Bargaining, Nash Program, Simultaneous Payoff, Demands, Uncertainty

Coalitional Bargaining, Nash Program, Simultaneous Payoff, Demands, Uncertainty

Publisher

Climate Change and Sustainable Development

Climate Change and Sustainable Development

Editor

Carlo Carraro

Carlo Carraro

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can form if an only if payoff demands are feasible as in the Nash (1953) demand game. After smoothing the game (as in Van Damme (1991)), when the noise vanishes, when the discount factor is close to 1, and as in OkadaÂ´s (2011), the coalitional Nash bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium.

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Suggested citation: Nieva, R., (2015), ‘The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands’, Nota di Lavoro 67.2015, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei