Negotiation and Optimality in an Economic Model of Global Climate Change
Data
01.01.2000
01.01.2000
Autori
Hans W. Gottinger
Codice JEL
D0,D6,H4,Q3
D0,D6,H4,Q3
Parole chiave:
Precautionary Principle,self-protection,self-insurance,comparative statics,information structure
Precautionary Principle,self-protection,self-insurance,comparative statics,information structure
Publisher
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor
Carlo Carraro
Carlo Carraro
We suggest a two-country, two-sector model as a basis for the control of global climate change in which the dynamic time path of the world economy is analysed under the provision that the outcomes of a negotiation game generate the global optimal solution.