Mitigation and Solar Radiation Management in Climate Change Policies
Vasiliki Manousi, Anastasios Xepapadeas
Climate Change, Mitigation, Geoengineering, Cooperation, Differential Game, Open Loop - Feedback Nash Equilibrium
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
We couple a spatially homogeneous energy balance climate model with an economic growth model which incorporates two potential policies against climate change: mitigation, which is the traditional policy, and geoengineering. We analyze the optimal policy mix of geoengineering and mitigation in both a cooperative and a noncooperative framework, in which we study open loop and feedback solutions. Our results suggests that greenhouse gas accumulation is relatively higher when geoengineering policies are undertaken, and that at noncooperative solutions incentives for geoengineering are relative stronger. A disruption of geoengineering efforts at a steady state will cause an upward jump in global temperature.