Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services
06.09.2023
Rosella Levaggi (Department of Economics and Management, University of Brescia); Michele Moretto (Department of Economics and Management, University of Padua); Paolo Pertile (Department of Economics, University of Verona)
H42, I18, D82
hospital payments, dynamic mechanism design, DRG, two-part tariffs, adverse selection, moral hazard
This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients’ severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the optimal dynamic contract and show that it is made up of two components: a time-invariant payment, which depends on the structural characteristics of the provider, and a time-varying component, which is affected by both patient and hospital characteristics. To illustrate the characteristics of the dynamic contract and compare it with a more standard static contract, we provide a numerical exercise calibrated with data from hip replacement hospitalisations in Italy.
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Citazione suggerita: R. Levaggi, M. Moretto, P. Pertile, ‘Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services’, Nota di Lavoro 016.2023, Milano, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei