COP 21 and Economic Theory: Taking Stock
Data
03.05.2016
03.05.2016
Autori
Henry Tulkens (CORE – Université catholique de Louvanin)
Codice JEL
F02, F55,H40, H87,Q52, Q54
F02, F55,H40, H87,Q52, Q54
Parole chiave:
Economic and Game Theory Concepts, International Climate Agreements, Voluntary Cooperation, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Transfers
Economic and Game Theory Concepts, International Climate Agreements, Voluntary Cooperation, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Transfers
Publisher
Economic Theory and Applications
Economic Theory and Applications
Editor
Carlo Carraro
Carlo Carraro
The texts of the COP 21 Decision and its Annex are scrutinized from the particular point of view of the extent to which economic theoretic concepts can be considered to inspire them. While this is shown to be partially the case in some of the intentions, the texts themselves contain more diplomatically formulated promises than implementation of mainstream well established economic concepts.
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Suggested citation: Tulkens, H., (2016), ‘COP 21 and Economic Theory: Taking Stock’, Nota di Lavoro 40.2016, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Forthcoming in Revue d’Économie Politique 126:3, Juin 2016, Paris, France