Business Tax Policy under Default Risk
Data
17.05.2019
17.05.2019
Autori
Nicola Comincioli (University of Brescia, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei); Sergio Vergalli (University of Brescia, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei); Paolo M. Panteghini (University of Brescia, CESifo)
Codice JEL
H25, G33, G38
H25, G33, G38
Parole chiave:
Capital Structure, Default Risk, Business Taxation and Welfare
Capital Structure, Default Risk, Business Taxation and Welfare
Publisher
Economic Theory and Applications
Economic Theory and Applications
Editor
Matteo Manera
Matteo Manera
In this article we use a stochastic model with one representative firm to study business tax policy under default risk. We will show that, for a given tax rate, the government has an incentive to reduce (increase) financial instability and default costs if its objective function is welfare (tax revenue).
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Suggested citation: Comincioli, N., S. Vergalli, P. M. Panteghini (2019), ‘Business Tax Policy under Default Risk ‘, Nota di Lavoro 11.2019, Milano, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.