A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games
Data
01.01.2006
01.01.2006
Autori
Dinko Dimitrov, Shao Chin Sung
Codice JEL
C71,A14,D20
C71,A14,D20
Parole chiave:
Coalition formation,Hedonic games,Separability,Taxonomy
Coalition formation,Hedonic games,Separability,Taxonomy
Publisher
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor
Carlo Carraro
Carlo Carraro
We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games.