Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy
Date
01.01.2006
01.01.2006
Authors
Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Mandar P Oak
JEL Code
C72,D72,H19
C72,D72,H19
Keywords:
Coalitions,Ideology,Rents
Coalitions,Ideology,Rents
Publisher
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor
Carlo Carraro
Carlo Carraro
We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected’. The coalitions that form depend upon the relative importance of rents of office and seat shares of the parties. If rents are high, governments cannot be surplus. With low rents or the formateur close to the median, minority governments occur for a wider ideological dispersion. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between connectedness of coalitions and rents.