November 22 2012

Venice, Italy: The Dynamics of Adaptation and Mitigation

The paper presented by Maddalena Ferranna, Toulouse School of Economics, explores the relationship between adaptation and mitigation in a dynamic model of contribution to a public good. The results show that due to the presence of adaptation, the incentives to free-ride are reduced because the benefits from the public good are lower, while at the same time, adaptation has a strategic effect inducing a decrease in the equilibrium mitigation effort.

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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