June 13 2013

Evolution of Coalitions in a Dynamic Game Interpretation of the UNFCCC Process

The alternative of cooperation versus non-cooperation is a central issue in the analysis and the understanding of international environmental agreements relating to climate change. Elaborating on his previous work, Henry Tulkens from Université Catholique de Louvain presents in this FEEM Seminar a paper that formulates a dynamic economic-environmental model in discrete time, to which a (discrete time) dynamic game is associated.

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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