Authors:
Valeria Costantini, University of Roma Tre – Italy
Alessio D’Amato, University of Rome “Tor Vergata” – Italy
Chiara Martini, University of Roma Tre – Italy
Maria Cristina Tommasino, ENEA – Italy
Edilio Valentini, University “G. D’Annunzio” of Chieti-Pescara – Italy
Mariangela Zoli, University of Rome “Tor Vergata” – Italy

Tradable permits regimes have usually ignored the role of permits taxation whereas the OECD and the European Union have recently emphasized the need for investigation on efficiency and effectiveness consequences. We develop a theoretical partial equilibrium model showing that accounting for permits taxation implies a distortion in the equilibrium price as well as an impact on abatement efforts distribution across economic agents. We further analyse such effects by using a Computable General Equilibrium model in which several options for permits taxation are simulated and the impacts on permits price, emissions, tax revenues and welfare are assessed.