Cooperation and Climate Change: a Dynamic Experiment?
15:00 - 16:30
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta 63
at FEEM Venice
h. 15.00 Seminar
Seminars Office, firstname.lastname@example.org
Marco Casari, University of Bologna
One factor that makes climate change mitigation difficult is its long-term horizon. Here we frame this social dilemma as a "public bad" that captures the key features of the problem and in particular its dynamic externality. In a theory-based experimental platform, we compare static vs. dynamic versions of the dilemma in order to assess how the dynamic aspect of this game affects the ability of countries to cooperate. While the average level of cooperation is similar, the a dynamic externality presents a strong, declining trend of cooperation.
Keywords: Experiment; Climate change; Cooperation; Inequality