FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2008 .029

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching


Authors: Vincent Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon, Wouter Vergote
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: Matching Problem,von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets,Farsighted Stability
JEL n.: C71,C78
JEL: Theoretical Economics
Pages: Vol. 6, pp. 499–521
Date: 2011

Abstract

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets to predict which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is a corewise stable matching. Thus, contrary to the von Neumann-Morgenstern (myopically) stable sets, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not corewise stable ones. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many- to-one matching problems with responsive preferences.

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