FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2005 .129

Political Cycles : The Opposition Advantage


Authors: Pascal Gautier, Raphaël Soubeyran
Series: Economy and Society
Editor: Fausto Panunzi
Type: Journal
Keywords: Cycles,Alternation,Public goods,Advantage,Opposition
JEL n.: D72,H41,C72
JEL: Journal of Public Economic Theory
Pages: Vol. 10, Issue 4, pp. 685-716
Date: 2008

Abstract

We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur.

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