FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2004 .041

International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems

Authors: Michael Finus
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Book
Keywords: International pollution,International environmental agreements,Treaty design,Coalition theory
JEL n.: C7,H41,Q2
JEL: Chapter in Welfare Economics of Sustainable Development from Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS), developed under the Auspices of the UNESCO
Published in: EOLSS Publishers, Oxford, UK
Date: 2004


This article provides a non-technical overview of important results of the game theoretical literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) on transboundary pollution control. It starts out by sketching features of first and second best solutions to the problem of transboundary pollution. It then argues that most actual IEAs can be considered at best as third best solutions. Therefore, three questions are raised: 1) Why is there a difference between actual IEAs and first and second best solutions? 2) Which factors determine this difference? 3) Which measures can help to narrow this difference? This article attempts to answer these questions after giving an informal introduction to coalition models.

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