FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2005 .041

Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements


Authors: Aart de Zeeuw
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: IEA’s,Coalitional stability,Dynamics
JEL n.: Q2,C70,F42
JEL: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Pages: Vol. 55, Issue 2, pp. 163-174
Date: 03/2008

Abstract

In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms for the stability of coalitions and has reached the conclusion that, under farsightedness, both large and small stable coalitions can occur. In the context of a repeated game, this implies that large stable coalitions can also be sustained over time by a simple trigger mechanism, for large enough discount factors. However, if changes in time implement changes in state, this conclusion does not hold anymore: only small stable coalitions can be sustained.

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