The energy transition and the value of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms
Data
09.10.2024
09.10.2024
Autori
Cinzia Bonaldo (RSE S.p.A. – Ricerca Sistema Energetico and University of Padova); Fulvio Fontini (University of Padova); Michele Moretto (University of Padova and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei)
Codice JEL
Q41,Q42, Q48, Q54. Q55, C80
Q41,Q42, Q48, Q54. Q55, C80
Parole chiave:
Energy transition, Capacity Remuneration Mechanism. Price cap, Renewable energiesInvestment value
Energy transition, Capacity Remuneration Mechanism. Price cap, Renewable energiesInvestment value
Publisher
Elsevier
Elsevier
JOURNAL
Energy Economics, November 2024
Energy Economics, November 2024
Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRMs) can be introduced in power markets to address market failures and ensure security of supply. However, investment in capacity is a dynamic process that depends on the evolution of prices and costs over time. In this paper, we investigate the value of capacity under a CRM using a stochastic approach. We focus on three possible technologies participating in the market: a Variable Renewable Energy source, a thermal efficient power plant (such as a Combined Cycle one) and a coal-fired power plant. These three types of capacities can be framed within a common theoretical framework with an increasing level of complexity.
We first present analytical models and then provide sensitivity analysis and calibration results. Our findings indicate that for all three technologies, the effect of the CRM is to cap the firm revenues and consequently to decrease their value. Moreover, the calibration provides a ranking of investments such that carbon emitting plants, in particular gas-fired ones, display higher values compared to renewable ones.