The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games
Date
01.01.2008
01.01.2008
Authors
Jingang Zhao
JEL Code
C62,C71
C62,C71
Keywords:
Coalition Formation,Core,Maximal Payoff,Minimum No-Blocking Payoff
Coalition Formation,Core,Maximal Payoff,Minimum No-Blocking Payoff
Publisher
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor
Carlo Carraro
Carlo Carraro
This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how to split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in coalitional TU games. Finally, it obtains analogous results in coalitional NTU (non-transferable utility) games.