FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2006 .091

When Inertia Generates Political Cycles


Authors: Raphäel Soubeyran
Series: Economy and Society
Editor: Fausto Panunzi
Type: Journal
Keywords: Political Cycles,Inertia
JEL n.: D72,H7
JEL: Economics Bulletin
Pages: Vol. 4, No. 31, pp. 1-8
Date: 2006

Abstract

We propose a simple infinite horizon of repeated elections with two candidates. Furthermore we suppose that the government policy presents some degree of inertia, i.e. a new government cannot completely change the policy implemented by the incumbent. When the policy inertia is strong enough, no party can win the election a consecutive infinite number of times.

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