FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2003 .118

Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty

Authors: Marita Laukkanen
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: Fisheries management,transboundary fisheries,non-cooperative games,implementation uncertainty
JEL n.: Q22,C72
JEL: Environmental and Resource Economics
Pages: Volume 32, Number 3
Date: November 2005


This paper examines how non-binding co-operative agreements on marine fisheries management can be sustained when management plans in participating countries are implemented with error. The effects of implementation uncertainty on voluntary  co-operation are compared to those of recruitment uncertainty. A self-enforcing co-operative solution can only be sustained when uncertainty is not too pronounced. Even when a co-operative agreement can be achieved, frequent phases of reversion to non-co-operative harvest levels are needed to support the agreement. The implications of recruitment uncertainty for implicit co-operation are less detrimental than those of implementation uncertainty.

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