FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2005 .132

Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games


Authors: Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Nicola Acocella
Series: Economy and Society
Type: Journal
Keywords: Policy games,policy ineffectiveness,static controllability,Nash equilibrium existence
JEL n.: C72,E52,E61
JEL: Economics Letters
Pages: Vol. 90, Issue 2, pp. 213-218
Date: 02/2006

Abstract

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

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