FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2003 .050

The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension


Authors: László Á. Kóczy, Luc Lauwers
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: Core,Non-emptiness,Indirect dominance,Outsider-independence
JEL n.: C71
JEL: Games and Economic Behavior
Pages: Vol. 61, No.2, pp. 277-298
Date: 11/2007

Abstract

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is,

with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.

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