The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension
Date
01.01.2003
01.01.2003
Authors
László Á. Kóczy, Luc Lauwers
JEL Code
C71
C71
Keywords:
Core,Non-emptiness,Indirect dominance,Outsider-independence
Core,Non-emptiness,Indirect dominance,Outsider-independence
Publisher
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor
Carlo Carraro
Carlo Carraro
A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is,
with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the minimal dominant set returns this core.