FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2012 .031

Regulating Global Biodiversity: What is the Problem?


Authors: Tim Swanson, Ben Groom
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Keywords: Global Biodiversity, International Environmental Policy, Nash Bargaining, Rational Threats
JEL n.: Q240, Q280

Abstract

We distinguish between local problems of biodiversity loss and global ones, where international cooperation is required.  Global biodiversity regulation involves choosing the optimal stopping rule regarding global land conversions, in order to ensure that some areas of unconverted natural reserves remain to support the production sector that exists on converted lands.  The basic difficulty with implementing a solution to this global problem lies in the asymmetry in endowments between those states that have previously converted, and those that have not.  We demonstrate that the fundamental problem of global biodiversity regulation is similar to the bargaining problem analysed by Nash, Rubinstein and others.  There are benefits from global land conversion, and there must be agreement on their distribution before the conversion process can be halted.  Since the institutions addressing global biodiversity problems are either highly ineffectual (benefit sharing agreements, prior informed consent clauses) or very extreme (incremental cost contracts), the biodiversity bargaining problem remains unresolved.  For this reason we anticipate that suboptimal conversions will continue to occur, as a way of protesting the ineffective and unfair approaches employed in addressing this problem to date.

Download file
Download PDF file

FEEM Newsletter & Update

Subscribe to stay connected.

Your personal data will be processed by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. – data Controller – with the aim of emailing the FEEM newsletter & Update. The use of Your email address is necessary for the implementation of the newsletter service. You are invited to read the Privacy Policy in order to obtain additional information about the protection of Your rights.

This Website uses technical cookies and cookie analytics, as well as “third party” profiling cookies.
If you close this banner or you decide to continue navigating on this Website, you express consent to the use of cookies. If you need additional information or you wish to express selective choices on the use of cookies, please refer to the   Cookie PolicyI agree