FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2000 .009

Partial and Global Cooperation with Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems


Authors: Jean-Christophe Pereau, Tarik Tazdait
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: Global environmental problems,coalition,unilateral commitment,Nash equilibrium,environmental tax
JEL n.: D74,Q28
JEL: Environmental and Resource Economics
Pages: Vol. 20, N. 3, pp. 225-239
Date: 2001

Abstract

This paper focuses on the link between the group co-operation and the unilateral commitment behaviour of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. As we consider that this last behaviour occurs when bargaining failed, we call it a precautious commitment. We also show that the emergence of a non-coordinate global co-operation can result from a strategic action from the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordination their emissions. Finally, when we introduce an environmental tax prescribed by the co-operating countries to the non-co-operating ones, co-operation becomes global and co-ordinate.

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