FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2003 .009

North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information


Authors: Alejandro Caparros, Jean-Christophe Pereau, Tarik Tazdaït
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: bargaining theory,asymmetric information,climate change,international cooperation
JEL n.: C78,D74,H77
JEL: Journal of Public Choice
Pages: 121: (3-4) 455-480
Date: 2004

Abstract

This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.
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