FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2017 .034

Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players

Authors: P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch
Series: Economic Theory and Applications
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Keywords: Marriage Problems, Stable Sets, Myopic and Farsighted Players
JEL n.: C70, C78


We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When all men are myopic and the top choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consisting of the woman-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set. The same result holds when all women are farsighted.


Suggested citation:  Herings, P. J.-J., A. Mauleon, V. Vannetelbosch, (2017), 'Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players', Nota di Lavoro 34.2017, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

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