FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro"
2017.034
Date: 17/6/2017

Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players


Authors:
P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Maastricht University); Ana Mauleon (CEREC - Saint Louis University, CORE - University of Louvain); Vincent Vannetelbosch (CORE - UNiversity of Louvain, CEREC - Saint Louis University)
JEL n.: C70, C78
Keywords: Marriage Problems, Stable Sets, Myopic and Farsighted Players

Abstract

We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When all men are myopic and the top choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consisting of the woman-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set. The same result holds when all women are farsighted.

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Suggested citation:  Herings, P. J.-J., A. Mauleon, V. Vannetelbosch, (2017), 'Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players', Nota di Lavoro 34.2017, Milan, Italy: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei


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