FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2003 .104

Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements


Authors: Carlo Carraro, Barbara Buchner
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: Agreements,Climate,Incentives,Negotiations,Policy
JEL n.: C72,H23,Q25,Q28
JEL: European Environment
Pages: Volume 14, Issue 5, pp. 276-289
Date: September/October 2004

Abstract

This paper analyses whether different emissions trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation process. Our analysis confirms the conjecture that, by appropriately designing the emission trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore, participation and optimal policy should be jointly analysed. Moreover, our results show that the US, Russia and China have different most preferred climate coalitions and therefore adopt conflicting negotiation strategies.

Download file
Download PDF file

FEEM Newsletter

Subscribe to stay connected.

Your personal data will be processed by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. – data Controller – with the aim of emailing the FEEM newsletter. The use of Your email address is necessary for the implementation of the newsletter service. You are invited to read the Privacy Policy in order to obtain additional information about the protection of Your rights.

This Website uses technical cookies and cookie analytics, as well as “third party” profiling cookies.
If you close this banner or you decide to continue navigating on this Website, you express consent to the use of cookies. If you need additional information or you wish to express selective choices on the use of cookies, please refer to the   Cookie PolicyI agree