FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2006 .083

Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy


Authors: Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Mandar P Oak
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: Coalitions,Ideology,Rents
JEL n.: C72,D72,H19
JEL: European Journal of Political Economy
Pages: Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 554-61
Date: 09/2008

Abstract

We analyze the relative importance of party ideology and rents from office in the formation of coalitions in a parliamentary democracy. In equilibrium, the types of coalitions that are formed may be minimal winning, minority or surplus and they may be ideologically `disconnected'. The coalitions that form depend upon the relative importance of rents of office and seat shares of the parties. If rents are high, governments cannot be surplus. With low rents or the formateur close to the median, minority governments occur for a wider ideological dispersion. Further, there is a non-monotonic relationship between connectedness of coalitions and rents.

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