FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2006 .072

Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core


Authors: Dinko Dimitrov, Claus Jochen Haake
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: Coalition Formation,Paradox of Smaller Coalitions,Semistrict Core,Simple Games,Winning Coalitions
JEL n.: D72,C71
JEL: Games and Economic Behavior
Pages: Vol. 62, Issue 2, pp. 460-475
Date: 03/2008

Abstract

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.

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