FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2001 .081

An Evolutionary Approach to the Climate Change Negotiation Game


Authors: Jean Christophe Péreau, Pierre Courtois, Tarik Tazdaït
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: Environmental negotiation,coalition,precautionary unilateral commitment,evolutionary process
JEL n.: D74,Q28
JEL: Recherches Economiques de Louvain
Date: 2004

Abstract

We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to consider a decision making structure characterised by agents with bounded knowledge practising mimics and learning from past events and strategies. We show on that framework that a third significant alternative to the binary coordination-defection strategies needs to be considered: a unilateral commitment as precautionary strategy. As a means to widen cooperation, we examine the influence of linking environmental and trade policies via the implementation of a trade penalty on non cooperative behaviours.
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