FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
1999 .058

A "Tragedy of the Clubs": Excess Entry in Exclusive Coalitions


Authors: Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: Clubs,Coalition formation,Multiperson bargaining
JEL n.: C78,D71
JEL: Journal of Public Economic Theory
Pages: Vol. 4(1), pp. 115-136
Date: 2002

Abstract

We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the "tragedy of the clubs". The tragedy of the clubs is a pervasive equilibrium phenomenon.

Download file
Download PDF file

FEEM Newsletter

Subscribe to stay connected.

Your personal data will be processed by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. – data Controller – with the aim of emailing the FEEM newsletter. The use of Your email address is necessary for the implementation of the newsletter service. You are invited to read the Privacy Policy in order to obtain additional information about the protection of Your rights.

This Website uses technical cookies and cookie analytics, as well as “third party” profiling cookies.
If you close this banner or you decide to continue navigating on this Website, you express consent to the use of cookies. If you need additional information or you wish to express selective choices on the use of cookies, please refer to the   Cookie PolicyI agree