FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
2005 .120

A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues


Authors: Federico Echenique, Mehmet B. Yenmez
Series: Climate Change and Sustainable Development
Editor: Carlo Carraro
Type: Journal
Keywords: Matching markets,Core,Lattice,Gale-Shapley algorithm
JEL n.: C65,C78
JEL: Games and Economics Behavior
Pages: Vol. 59, Issue 1, pp. 46-71
Date: 04/2007

Abstract

We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.

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